The roles of the amygdala in the affective regulation of body, brain and behaviour by Mirolli, Marco et al.
The Roles of the Amygdala in the Affective
Regulation of Body, Brain, and Behaviour
Marco Mirolli, Francesco Mannella, Gianluca Baldassarre
Laboratory of Computational Embodied Neuroscience,
Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione,
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (LARAL-ISTC-CNR)
Via San Martino della Battaglia 44, I-00185 Roma, Italy
fmarco.mirolli, francesco.mannella, gianluca.baldassareg@istc.cnr.it
Abstract. Despite the great amount of knowledge produced by the neu-
roscientific literature affective phenomena, current models tackling non-
cognitive aspects of behavior are often bio-inspired but rarely bio-constrained.
This paper presents a theoretical account of affective systems centered on
the amygdala. This account aims to furnish a general framework and spe-
cific pathways to implement models that are more closely related to bi-
ological evidence. The amygdala, which receives input from brain areas
encoding internal states, innately relevant stimuli, and innately neutral
stimuli, plays a fundamental role inmotivational and emotional processes
of organisms. This role is based on the fact that amygdala implements the
two associative processes at the core of Pavlovian learning (CS-US and
CS-UR associations), and that it has the capacity of modulating these as-
sociations on the basis of internal states. These functionalities allow the
amygdala to play an important role in the regulation of the three fun-
damental classes of affective responses (namely, the regulation of body
states, the regulation of brain states via neuromodulators, and the trig-
gering of a number of basic behaviours fundamental for adaptation) and
in the regulation of three high-level cognitive processes (namely, the af-
fective labeling of memories, the production of goal-directed behaviours,
and the performance of planning and complex decision making). Our
analysis is conducted within a methodological approach that stresses the
importance of understanding the brain within an evolutionary/adaptive
framework and with the aim of isolating general principles that can po-
tentially account for the wider possible empirical evidence in a coherent
fashion.
1 Introduction
Since the birth of cognitive sciences in the 1950s, the study of cognitive func-
tions (e.g., perception, attention, memory, planning and decision making) has
dominated the sciences of behavior, relegating research on the non-cognitive as-
pects of behavior (e.g., motivations, moods, emotions) to a marginal role. In
general, this is true for all the disciplines dedicated to the study of behavior: for
the empirical sciences, from neuroscience to psychology, and for the ‘sciences
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fields of connectionism, autonomous robotics, artificial life, and the simulation
of adaptive behavior.
From the point of view of the sciences of the artificial, while classical arti-
ficial intelligence research was exclusively dedicated to the study of cognitive
capacities, pioneering works on the affective aspects of behavior have been con-
ducted in the fields of artificial life and new robotics from the very beginning
(e.g., see Cecconi and Parisi, 1993; Balkenius, 1993; Pfeifer, 1993). The reason for
this is related to the significant shift of attention, in the emerging embodied cog-
nition framework, from high level cognitive processes to low level ones, and to
the importance attributed to the link between behavior and its biological basis
(body, brain, and environment). One of the driving ideas of embodied cognition
research is considering behavior and cognition from an adaptive point of view,
that is on the basis of the advantages that they can give to organisms in terms of
capacity to survive and reproduce. From this perspective, the motivational and
emotional aspects of behavior are at least as important as the cognitive ones.
The capacity of survival and reproduction of organisms depends on several
different abilities, for example the ability to find food and water, the ability to
prevent that the body gets damaged, and to recover when this happens, the
ability to find a sexual partner willing to copulate and reproduce, the ability to
escape from predators, the ability to find a suitable place for resting and sleep-
ing, and so on. If an agent has to satisfy all these needs, a crucial ‘meta-ability’
is required, namely the ability to manage the interactions between all these ac-
tivities. In particular, in each moment the organism must solve the problem of
establishing which need it should attend. Affective systems allow organisms to
solve precisely this problem, that is to choose which is the activity that has to
be accomplished in each moment.
In sharp contrast with what happens in real organisms, artificial systems
tend to be designed to accomplish only one or a very few well designed tasks,
for example finding the food, or navigating in a complex environment, or cate-
gorising a certain object, or grasping and manipulating objects, or coordinating
with other agents, and so on. In this kind of agents the problem of selecting
which activity to pursue in each moment does not arise because there is only
one activity that they can and must pursue in every moment. This is the reason
why even in the field of the simulation of adaptive behavior the study of moti-
vations and emotions has always received little attention. In the last years, the
realization of the extreme importance that the non-cognitive factors of behavior
play in organisms’ behavior (Parisi, 2004; Arbib and Fellous, 2004; Canamero,
2005) has significantly boosted the number of researches dedicated to these as-
pects in the fields of artificial life and autonomous robotics (e.g. Canamero,
1997; Balkenius and More´n, 1999; Murphy, 2002; Mirolli and Parisi, 2003; Avila-
Garcia and Canamero, 2004; Montebelli et al., 2008; Venditti et al., 2009).
The relationship between this kind of research and the empirical sciences
is typically quite weak, if not completely absent. Generally speaking, the arti-
ficial systems developed in these fields are, at most, biologically inspired (bio-
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the empirical knowledge on the behavior of natural organisms is at most used
as a source of interesting ideas, but is not systematically used for constraining
the design of artificial systems, nor for testing their empirical predictions. Such
a state of affairs has both its motivations and its potential advantages. For ex-
ample, a certain division of labour between empirical and artificial scientists
is necessary. Furthermore, the freedom of not being constrained by available
data and knowledge can lead to the development of new ways of framing old
problems and of investigating them (i.e. to new ‘research paradigms’), and to
the discovery of new interesting specific problems and principles. Finally, it
must also be considered that a significant proportion of artificial life research
has technological rather than scientific aims, and, from a technological point
of view, taking into account how natural organisms work is not a need but, at
most, an opportunity.
On the other hand, at least from the scientific point of view, the current state
of affairs has also important limits. The biological sciences, and the brain sci-
ences in particular, have been producing a huge amount of knowledge on all
the aspects that are relevant for understanding organisms’ behavior. Further-
more, this empirical knowledge seems to be doomed to grow at an even higher
pace in the near future. For this reason, trying to incorporate this knowledge
in the design of artificial systems more systematically is likely to produce a
fundamental positive impact in our ability to build artificial systems with be-
havioral capacities more similar to those of natural organisms. This, in its turn,
would undoubtedly increase the impact that research on artificial system has
on the behavioral and brain sciences. In fact, if it is undeniable that the latter
disciplines are producing a large amount of relevant data, it is also true that
integrative theories that are able to explain these data and predict new ones are
quite scarce. Bio-constrained computational models represent very promising
tools for developing these types of theories.
The present work follows an approach which can be called Computational
Embodied Neuroscience (or ‘CEN’, cf. Mannella et al., 2009). According to this
approach, behaviour and brain are considered as means through which organ-
isms adapt to the environment in order to increase their chances of survival
and reproduction. Consequently, understanding the brain requires understand-
ing how it is structured, functions, and learns in order to produce adaptive
behaviour. Moreover, CEN stresses the importance of producing computational
models that capture general principles underlying several different behaviours
and brain phenomena rather than ad-hoc models addressing only the outcome
of single behavioural or neuroscientific experiments. In line with these two
principles, our aim here is to furnish both a general framework and several spe-
cific suggestions for designing and implementing computational models that
have a unifying theoretical scope.
In this paper we contribute to the study of non-cognitive aspects of behav-
ior in artificial systems by providing a theoretical framework on behavior that
is based on the available empirical knowledge regarding one of the parts of
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organisms, namely the amygdala. In particular, we propose a general brain ar-
chitecture centered on the amygdala, and a number of specific hypotheses on
the various functional roles that amygdala plays in the regulation of both af-
fective and cognitive processes. The neuroscientific and behavioral data taken
into consideration here mainly refer to the literature on rats. However, the prin-
ciples proposed and reviewed in the article can probably be extended to more
complex mammals (in particular, non-human primates and humans), as most
of the brain systems considered here are homologous to those subserving sim-
ilar functions in primates. The ideas presented here are intended to boost the
design and implementation of biologically-constrained computational models
like the ones presented by the authors in previous works (e.g., Mannella et al.,
2007; Mannella et al., 2008).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a general
overview of the amygdala and of the various roles that it plays in the func-
tional organization of adaptive behavior. Section 3 illustrates the three main
functioning principles that characterize amygdala as themain locus of classical-
conditioning associations. Section 4 presents the three basic functions that amyg-
dala plays in the regulation of affective responses. Section 5 shows the three
higher-level functions that amygala plays by interacting with cognitive pro-
cesses. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. All the acronyms used throughout
the paper are listed in the Appendix (table 6).
2 Amygdala’s roles in adaptive behavior: overview
The Amygdala (Amg) is an almond-shaped group of nuclei located within each
medial temporal lobe of the brain (figure 1). Amg is an important component
of several brain subsystems involving the hypothalamus, insular cortex, brain
stem, basal forebrain, hippocampus, basal ganglia, and prefrontal cortex, and it
has been associated with a wide range of functions including affective regula-
tion, learning, action selection, memory, attention, and perception.
The fundamental hypothesis that underlies the framework proposed in this
paper, and schematised in figure 2, is that amygdala is the place where most
classical conditioning associations 1 are acquired on the basis of three basic mech-
anisms, which roughly correspond to the three major sub-components in which
Amg can be divided, that is the central extended amygdala (CEA), the basolat-
eral amygdaloid complex (BLA), and the medial extended amygdala (MEA):
1. CEA associates neutral stimuli (conditioned stimuli, ‘CS’) directly to ba-
sic responses (unconditioned responses, ‘UR’) that are strictly related to
1 Other classical conditioning associations involving for example basic reflexes like eye
blinking are known to be stored in the cerbellum (CB; Thompson et al., 2000). Of
course, all classical conditioning processes involve also other parts of the brain be-
yond Amg and CB, such as the brain stem nuclei and PFC.
5Fig. 1. Nuclei and their subdivisions of rat amygdala. Acronyms: AB (accessory basal
amygdaloid nucleus), B (basal amygdaloid nucleus), BL (basolateral amygdaloid nu-
cleus), BLA (basolateral amygdaloid complex), BNST (bed nucleus of the stria termi-
nalis) CEA (central extended amygdala), CM (central medial amygdaloid nucleus), CL
(central lateral amygdaloid nucleus), CLC (central amygdaloid nucleus, lateral capsu-
lar subdivision), ITC (intercalated nuclei), LA (lateral amygdaloid nucleus), Ld (lateral
dorsal amygdaloid nucleus), Lvl (lateral ventrolateral amygdaloid nucleus), Lvm (lat-
eral ventromedial amygdaloid nucleus), MEA (medial extended amygdala), Md (medial
amygdaloid nucleus, dorsal part), Mv (medial amygdaloid nucleus, ventral part).
organisms’ survival and reproduction on the basis of the experienced co-
occurrence of these neutral stimuli and the stimuli that are innately2 linked
to such basic responses by evolution (unconditioned stimuli, ‘US’). The re-
sult of this process is the formation of CS-UR associations.
2. BLA associates neutral stimuli (CS) not directly to the basic responses (UR)
but rather to the unconditioned stimuli (US) that are innately associated
to those responses on the basis of the CS-US co-occurrences experienced
during lifetime. The result of this process is the formation of CS-US associ-
ations.
2 Note that in thewhole paperwewill use the expressions ‘unlearned’, ‘unconditioned’,
or ‘innate’ to refer to responses that might be either innate or developed during the
very first phases of life under strong genetic guidance and general environmental
constraints (cf. Arias and Chotro, 2007).
63. MEA modulates CEA’s and BLA’s representations of stimuli and/or re-
sponses (in particular, URs and USs) on the basis of internal body states
(i.e. on the basis of the current needs of the organism).
Amg performs these functions on the basis of three main classes of inputs:
1. Body states information, coming from visceral systems, that either constitute
unconditioned stimuli or modulate the representations of unconditioned
stimuli and responses.
2. Innately relevant information, coming from somatosensory, gustatory, and ol-
factory systems, that represent unconditioned stimuli.
3. Innately neutral information, coming from visual, auditory, polimodal, and
associative areas, that represent stimuli that can be conditioned (i.e. associ-
ated to unconditioned stimuli and/or responses).
The basic unconditioned responses (UR) strictly related to survival and re-
production that amygdala is able to associate to innately neutral stimuli con-
stitute, in our view, the fundamental aspects of affective behavior. 3 These re-
sponses can be divided in three basic classes:
1. Regulation of body states, accomplished through the links to the sympathetic,
parasympathetic and hormonal systems.
2. Diffuse brain modulation, accomplished through the links to the four main
neuromodulatory systems.
3. Triggering of unlearned behaviors, accomplished through the links to the var-
ious centers that control such basic behaviors.
Finally, the amygdala has at least three other main outputs, through which
it modulates three fundamental cognitive processes on the basis of affective
states, thus allowing the emergence of important new cognitive functionalities:
1. Affective labeling, accomplished through the reciprocal connections with the
Hip, which is responsible for the encoding and consolidation of episodic
memories: these connections allow Amg to include motivational and emo-
tional elements in such memories and to enhance their encoding and recall.
2. Goal-directed behavior, accomplished through the connections targeting the
NAccC-PL loop, which is responsible for the higher-level stages of action-
selection: these connections allow the affective state of an organism to in-
fluence the selection of behaviors acquired through operant conditioning.
3. Planning and decision-making, accomplished through the reciprocal connec-
tions with PFC, which hosts many important cognitive processes such as
working memory, attention, and prediction: these connections allow affec-
tive states to influence the processes taking place in PFC, thus guiding top-
down attention, monitoring of action execution, complex decision making,
and planning.
3 Throughout the paper we will use the word ‘affective’ to refer to both motivational
and emotional aspects of behaviour.
7Fig. 2. Scheme indicating themain functions played by Amg and themain brain anatom-
ical areas which implement such functions. The scheme indicates the three main classes
of input received by Amg, the three basic mechanisms it implements, the three types of
output through which it regulates the affective responses, and the three main influences
it exerts on higher cognitive processes (see text for details). Ancronyms: BLA (basolat-
eral amygdaloid complex), CEA (central extended amygdala) DIg (disgranular insular
cortex, gustatory part), DIv (disgranular insular cortex, visceral part), DR (dorsal raphe),
En (endopiriform nucleus), Hip (hippocpampus), ILN (infralaminar nucleus), ITC (inter-
calated nuclei), LC (locus coeruleus), LDT (laterodorsal tegmental nucleus), LG (lateral
geniculate nucleus), LH (lateral hypothalamus), MEA (medial extended amygdala), MG
(medial geniculate nucleus), NaccC (nucleus accumbens core), OB (olfactory bulb), PAG
(periaqueductal gray), PaRh Parietal rhinal cortex, PC (piriform cortex), PFC (prefrontal
cortex), PPT (pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus), PRC (perirhinal cortex), PVN (par-
aventricular nucleus of hypothalamus), S (subiculum), SNpc (substantia nigra, pars
compacta), Te2 (temporal cortex, area 2), Te3 (temporal cortex, area 3), VMH (ventrome-
dial hypothalamus), VPMpc (ventral posteromedial nucleus, parvicellular part), VTA
(ventral tegmental area), vmPFC (ventromedial prefrontal cortex).
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Individual learning plays a fundamental role in the adaptive behavior of organ-
isms, especially in the most sophisticated ones like mammals. For this reason,
animal psychology has devoted great efforts to the study of learning processes.
In particular, in the last century a huge body of empirical data has been col-
lected around the two main experimental paradigms of ‘classical conditioning’
and ‘instrumental conditioning’.
Classical conditioning (or Pavlovian conditioning) refers to an experimental
paradigm in which a certain basic behaviour such as salivation or approaching
(UR), which is innately linked to a biologically salient stimulus such as food
ingestion (US), gets associated to a neutral stimulus like the sound of a bell
(CS), after the neutral stimulus is repeatedly presented before the appearance
of the salient stimulus. Such acquired associations, as mentioned in section 2,
are briefly referred to as ‘CS-US’ or ‘CS-UR’ associations (Pavlov, 1927; Lieber-
man, 1993, see below).
Instrumental conditioning (or operant conditioning) refers to an experimental
paradigm in which an animal, given a certain stimulus, such as a lever in a
cage (the stimulus, ‘S’), learns to produce a particular action such as pressing
the lever (the response, ‘R’), if the performed action consistently leads to a re-
warding outcome, such as the access to food. In this case, the acquired asso-
ciations are briefly referred to as ‘S-R’ associations (Thorndike, 1911; Skinner,
1938; Domjan, 2006).
The currentmost influential models of conditioning phenomena, those based
on temporal-difference reward prediction error (Schultz et al., 1997; Sutton and Barto,
1998; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Schultz, 2002), suffer from various limi-
tations (cf. Redgrave et al., 1999; Dayan, 2002; Redgrave and Gurney, 2006;
Berridge, 2007; Mannella et al., 2007). For example, they tend to conflate clas-
sical and instrumental conditioning, and they do not take into account the in-
fluences of internal states on the acquisition and expression of conditioned re-
sponses. One of the reasons of these limits is that such models have been de-
veloped within machine learning with the aim of building artificial systems
that can autonomously learn to perform actions that are useful for the user. As
a result, they are more suitable for investigating instrumental conditioning phe-
nomena but less adequate to explain Pavlovian ones (Dayan and Balleine, 2002;
O’Reilly et al., 2007).
From the scientific point of view, the available empirical knowledge indi-
cates that basal ganglia represent the main neural substrate where the S-R as-
sociations acquired through instrumental conditioning are stored (Barto, 1995;
Bar-Gad et al., 2003; Yin and Knowlton, 2006), whereas amygdala represents
the main neural substrate where the associations acquired through Pavlovian
conditioning are stored (Baxter and Murray, 2002; Cardinal et al., 2002).
A crucial question on classical conditioning regards the nature of the ac-
quired association between the CS and the UR: is this association direct (CS-
UR), as Hull (Hull, 1943) suggested, or does it pass through the unconditioned
stimuli (CS-US-UR), as Pavlov himself seemed to claim (Pavlov, 1927)? The
9long-lasting debate on this topic (Lieberman, 1993) seems now to have settled in
favor of both hypotheses: there is in fact strong empirical evidence supporting
the co-existence of both CS-UR and CS-US associations (Dayan and Balleine,
2002). In particular, the available empirical evidence suggests that CEA stores
CS-UR associations, whereas BLA stores CS-US associations (Cardinal et al.,
2002; Mannella et al., 2008). The rest of this section describes our hypotheses on
the specific mechanisms that Amg might exploit to implement these two basic
functionalities and to modulate them on the basis of the current internal states.
3.1 CEA as the locus of US-UR associations
All animals are genetically endowed with a set of basic responses that have a
high direct relevance for their survival and reproduction. These responses be-
long to three classes: (a) internal responses directed to regulate the states of the
body of the organism (discussed in section 4.1); (b) neuromodulatory responses
that influence the general states of the brain or the relative activity of different
parts of it (discussed in section 4.2); (c) basic behavioral responses (discussed
in section 4.3). These responses are innately linked to specific stimuli so that
when a given stimulus is perceived, the appropriate responses are automati-
cally triggered. For example, when an animal perceives the odour of a predator
its heart-rate speeds up (body), its general alertness increases (brain), and its
body might freeze (behavior).
In the case of complex animals living in a complex and dynamic world, it is
not possible for evolution to a-priori associate the appropriate responses to all
the possible stimuli that the animals can encounter during life. The solution that
evolution found to this problem is endowing animals with a learning system
that associates the basic unconditioned responses to the conditioned stimuli
that are systematically experienced in conjunction with (or as predecessors of)
the relative basic unconditioned stimuli. CEA is the part of the brain that learns
and stores most of these CS-UR associations. In fact, CEA has been shown to
be necessary for the acquisition and expression of both aversive (e.g., freezing)
and appetitive (e.g., approaching) conditioned reactions (Shi and Davis, 1999;
Nader et al., 2001; Lanuza et al., 2004; Hatfield et al., 1996; Parkinson et al.,
2000). For example, Hatfield et al. (1996) showed that CEA lesions impair the
capacity of rats to acquire the association between an unconditioned response
(orienting) and a conditioned stimulus (light), while lesions of BLAdo not affect
this capacity.
CEA is able to make these associations thanks to its pattern of connectivity
(see figure 3). From the efferent side, CEA constitutes the main output gate-
way of Amg, sending projections to several brain areas that control all three
kinds of unlearned responses (affecting the body, the brain, and basic behav-
iors, see section 4). On the afferent side, CEA receives external projections from
both the brain areas having information about unconditioned stimuli (i.e. vis-
ceral, somatosensory, olfactory and gustatory) and from those having informa-
tion about conditioned stimuli (i.e. visual, auditory, polimodal, and associative)
(McDonald, 1998; Jolkkonen and Pitka¨nen, 1998; Sah et al., 2003). Furthermore,
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both these kinds of information arrive to CEA also indirectly, via its afferent
projections from BLA, in particular from LA, which constitutes the principal
input gateway of the whole Amg: in fact, also LA receives information on both
innately relevant and on neutral stimuli required for classical conditioning as-
sociations (McDonald, 1998; Pitka¨nen et al., 2000; Sah et al., 2003; Maren, 2005;
Pare´ et al., 2004). CS-UR associations involve both the internal (from BLA) and
the external (from the rest of the brain) afferent projections to CEA since LA
lesions sometimes impede these associations (Lanuza et al., 2004; Blair et al.,
2005), while in other cases they do not (Hatfield et al., 1996).
Figure 3 provides a schematization of CS-UR learning in CEA. CS-UR as-
sociations can be acquired through the modification of the afferent connections
going from conditioned stimuli (CSs), represented either within LA or outside
Amg, to an unlearned responses (URs) that are triggered by the unconditioned
stimuli (USs) which are systematically paired with the given CSs (the scheme
is both a simplification and an elaboration of the computational model that the
authors used for simulating experiments on second-order conditioning in nor-
mal and BLA lesioned rats, see Mannella et al., 2008; see also section 4.2).
Fig. 3. CEA: schematization of the learning of CS-UR associations (thin arrows) on the
basis of the pre-existing unlearned US-UR associations (thick arrows). Ancronyms: Amg
(amygdala), CEA (central extended amygdala) LA (lateral amygdaloid nucleus).
3.2 BLA as the locus of CS-US associations
Direct CS-UR associations have a clear adaptive advantage, but have also two
limitations. First, among the unconditioned responses that can be triggered by
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CEA (and hence can be associated to conditioned stimuli through CS-UR learn-
ing) there is not the production of learning signals, for example the production
of the phasic dopaminergic bursts (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz and Dickinson,
2000) or noradrenergic bursts (Berridge andWaterhouse, 2003) that are thought
to be at the basis of learning. In fact, CEA has mainly inhibitory GABAergic
efferent connections (McDonald, 1998), for example reaching VTA producing
dopamine (DA) or LC producing norepinephrine (NE). When these connec-
tions reach target areas they tend to produce modulatory tonic signals instead
of the phasic signals that are thought to trigger learning (cf. section 4.2). More-
over, while CEA lesions disrupts the capacity to show CS-UR associations, they
do not disrupt the capacity of conditioned stimuli to be used as reinforcements
in second-order conditioning (Hatfield et al., 1996). The second limitation of
having only CS-UR associations is that the direct association of stimuli with
basic reactions would not allow the use of conditioned stimuli for influencing
more complex cognitive processes. In order to overcome these limitations the
brain evolved a mechanism to link neutral stimuli to unconditioned stimuli, so that
the presentation of a CS can recall the associated US and both trigger the phasic
bursts of neuromodulators driving learning and modulate high-level cognitive
processes.
There is plenty of evidence that BLA is the part of the brain that learns and
stores CS-US associations. In fact, BLA has been shown to be necessary for both
the modulation of high-level cognitive processes by motivational/emotional
states (see section 5) and the manifestation of second-order conditioning phe-
nomena, in which a conditioned stimulus (e.g., a light) is used as a secondary
reward in extinction (i.e. without first order reward) in order to condition a
second neutral stimulus (e.g., a tone) (Hatfield et al., 1996). The acquisition of
rewarding effects by conditioned stimuli that have been systematically experi-
enced with unconditioned stimuli is likely to depend on BLA excitatory glu-
tamatergic connections (which are suitable for causing phasic responses) that
directly or indirectly target mid-brain neurons that produce neuromodulators
(see, for example, figure 4 for DA, which is produced by neurons in VTA and
SNpc).
BLA is able to make these associations thanks to its connectivity (figure 4).
As discussed above, LA (which is part of BLA) is the main input gateway of
the whole Amg, receiving information both regarding USs (from visceral, gus-
tatory, olfactory, and somatosensory areas) and regarding CSs (from visual, au-
ditory, polimodal and associative areas). Furthermore, the areas of BLA that re-
ceive these two kinds of information are reciprocally interconnected, thus per-
mitting the associations between CSs and USs to take place.
Interestingly, the internal connectivity within BLA suggests that the conver-
gence between CSs and USs takes place in two sites organised in sequence: (a)
at the level of Lv (which is a part of LA) visceral, somatosensory and gustatory
information (USs) converge with auditory and visual information (Romanski
et al., 1993; Pitka¨nen et al., 1995; Maren, 2005); (b) at the level of BL, information
about USs converges with highly integrated polimodal information from hip-
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pocampal, cortical associative and cortical prefrontal areas (McDonald, 1998;
Pitka¨nen et al., 2000; Price, 2003; Sah et al., 2003). This hierarchy in BLA’s in-
ternal connectivity suggests that USs can be associated with stimuli of different
levels of complexity: from the simplest unimodal stimuli that are typically used
in classical conditioning experiments (e.g., lights or tones), to complex objects,
context, or places, like in conditioned place preference experiments (Hiroi and
White, 1991; McDonald and White, 1993).
Finally, the representations of USs, which can be recalled by associated CSs,
can control three different classes of systems thanks to different sets of BLA
efferent projections (see figure 4). First, projections to Hip (McDonald, 1998;
Richter-Levin, 2004), NAcc (Cador et al., 1989; Pitka¨nen et al., 2000), and PFC
(Rolls, 2000; Sah et al., 2003) allow conditioned stimuli to influence cognitive
functions (see section 5 below). Second, projections to neuromodulatory sys-
tems (e.g., VTA and SNpc for DA, reached by BLA through LH and PPT (Mc-
Donald, 1998; Pitka¨nen et al., 2000) allow conditioned stimuli to act as second-
order reinforcements by producing the activity bursts that are supposed to
drive learning. Third, intra-amygdaloid projections to CEA (Sah et al., 2003)
allow CSs to trigger all the URs normally triggered by the associated USs.
Figure 4 represents a schematization of the BLA functioning: CS-US associa-
tions are learned through themodification of the BLA lateral connections which
link the representations of innately neutral stimuli with those of unconditioned
stimuli which innately trigger unconditioned responses. This scheme is both
a simplification and an elaboration of the computational models that we used
for simulating real experiments on both second-order conditioning (Mannella
et al., 2008) and devaluation (Mannella et al., 2007, 2009; see also section 5.2).
Finally, it is important to mention that all the CS-US associative properties
which we have so far ascribed to BLA likely depend on a wider system formed
by BLA and OFC, a region of PFC with which BLA exchanges dense reciprocal
interconnections. In fact, experiments involving lesioning either BLA or OFC
show that it is very difficult to dissociate the functions of BLA and those of OFC
(Schoenbaum et al., 2007; Pickens et al., 2005; Roesch and Schoenbaum, 2006),
although recent investigations are starting to show that OFC is more closely
involved with working memory processes whereas BLA is more closely related
to learning CS-US associations (Schoenbaum et al., 2003, cf. also section 5.3).
3.3 MEA as the locus of the modulation of USs and URs by internal states
The mechanisms by which an organism can learn to associate innately neu-
tral stimuli to innately specific responses strictly linked to survival and repro-
duction are really useful only if there is a way to modulate these associations
according to the current internal state of the organism. For example, let us con-
sider feeding behavior. Even in presence of the stimuli that have been repeat-
edly experienced as predictive of food, it is useful to trigger all the responses
related to feeding (e.g., orienting, approaching, salivating, etc.) only when the
energy level of the organism is low (i.e. when the organism is hungry), but not
when the organism is satiated. If this does not happen, when encountering a
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Fig. 4. BLA: schematization of the learning of CS-US associations (thin arrows) on the ba-
sis of the pre-existing unlearned US-UR associations (thick arrows). Ancronyms: Amg
(amygdala), BL (basolateral amygdaloid nucleus), CeA (central amygdaloid nucleus),
LH (lateral hypothalamus), PPT (pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus), SNpc (substan-
tia nigra, pars compacta), VTA (ventral tegmental area).
place where there is plenty of food an organism would indefinetely continue to
produce feeding related responses, thus risking, for example, to die of thirst. As
discussed in section 1, regulating which kind of activity an organism pursues
in each moment is exactly the function of a well designed motivational system.
The regulation of organisms’ activities on the basis of its current internal state is
what makes organisms’ behavior proactive (i.e. controlled by their needs) rather
than reactive (i.e. completely determined by external stimuli).
The need to flexibly and efficiently modulate basic unconditioned responses
on the basis of the current state of the body might even constitute one of the
most important reasons why the CS-US system in BLA has evolved to supple-
ment the probably more basic CS-UR system in CEA. In order to understand
why, let us consider the case of food devaluation. There can be two types of
devaluation: ‘temporary’, for example when the organism is satiated, and ‘per-
manent’, for example when a food turned out to be toxic (e.g., its ingestion was
followed by nausea).
In principle, temporary devaluation might be efficiently faced even with
only a CS-UR system: if the current state of the body directly modulates the
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unconditioned responses related to feeding (e.g., orienting, approaching, sali-
vating), then these responses could be temporarily blocked regardless of the
stimulus that would trigger them (be it unconditioned or conditioned). But
the same solution is not viable for permanent devaluation: an animal cannot
permanently block all feeding responses, otherwise it would die of starvation.
Moreover, for an animal which possesses only a CS-UR system, also a solution
in which permanent devaluation is done at the level of the US is satisfying. In
fact, such a solution could not prevent the triggering of preparatory feeding re-
sponses by those CSs that have been associated with the devaluated food, with
the result of an inefficient activity directed towards the dangerous food.
A CS-US system allows solving this problem. The reason is that in such a
system devaluation can be done at the level of the US. In this way, the devalu-
ated US can inhibit the URs that are innately associated to it without preventing
other stimuli to trigger those responses when neither the devaluated US nor the
CSs linked to it are present. This solution can work equally well for both tem-
porary and permanent devaluation.
While a considerable amount of empirical research has been dedicated to
understanding the roles of CEA and BLA in CS-(US)-UR associations, much
less work has been done to clarify the exact neural mechanisms through which
unconditioned responses are modulated by the internal states of organisms.
The available empirical evidence suggests that this is exactly the function of
the third main group of Amg nuclei, namely MEA. First of all, there is evidence
that MEA does indeed play a role in regulating the triggering of basic behav-
iors on the basis of the state of the body: for example, lesions to MEA have
been shown to produce disturbances to feeding behavior that lead to obesity
(King, 2006), which depends on the incapacity of regulating the triggering of
an unconditioned behavior (e.g., feeding) on the basis of the current state of the
body (e.g., the level of hunger). Second, MEA has just the right kind of con-
nectivity for supporting this modulatory function (see figure 5). In fact, MEA
is reciprocally connected to Hyp (in particular VMH, LH, and PVN: Pitka¨nen
et al., 2000; De Olmos et al., 2004), which is the main center which processes
the information regarding the current states of the body. Moreover, MEA sends
efferent inhibitoryGABAergic projections to both CEA and BLA (Pitka¨nen et al.,
1997; De Olmos et al., 2004), and receives excitatory connection from BLA.
Figure 5 represents a schematization of how MEA could modulate both US
and UR representations in BLA and CEA on the basis of the current body states.
Once a representation of US in BLA gets activated (either directly, or via the
activation of an associated CS), it tends to activate the respective representation
in MEA. If the parts of the brain representing the state of the body (e.g., the
Hyp) inform MEA that that US is devaluated, the corresponding unit in MEA
gets fully activated and can inhibit both the representation of the stimulus in
BLA and the representations of the corresponding URs in CEA.
Within this scheme, temporary devaluation (e.g., caused by free feeding and
satiation) might be implemented by inhibitory connections from MEA to CEA
and BLA which have both fast learning and fast forgetting. In this way, for
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example, when the organism is satiated these connections might strengthen
and inhibit the related US and UR, whereas when the organism is hungry they
might decrease thus allowing the triggering of feeding-related responses. Per-
manent devaluation might be implemented by other similar connections which
have a fast learning but a slow forgetting.
This schema might also explain a last important phenomenon, known as
incentive learning (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Balleine and Killcross, 2006),
shown in experiments where the current value of a US (say ‘USa’) is trans-
ferred to another US (say ‘USb’) only if the animal can experience USb after
the devaluation of USa. The explanation is that if USb is not re-experienced af-
ter devaluation of USa the connections from its representation in MEA and the
one in BLA (and the relative URs in CEA) has not grown up, thus not inhibit-
ing the responses to the associated CSs. On the other hand, as soon as USb is
re-experienced when the animal is in a satiated condition, the inhibitory con-
nections would immediately grow, thus preventing the associated CS to trigger
the unconditioned responses.
Fig. 5. MEA: schematization of the modulation of Pavlovian associations based on in-
ternal states, plastic connections (thin arrows) and innate connections (thick arrows).
Circle edges denote inhibitory connections whereas arrow edges denote excitatory con-
nections. Ancronyms: Amg (amygdala), BLA (basolateral amygdaloid complex), CeA
(central amygdaloid nucleus), MeA (medial amygdaloid nucleus).
4 The roles of the amygdala in affective processes
According to the framework presented in section 2 Amg has evolved to ef-
ficiently associate several innate responses (URs) that are directly important
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for organisms’ survival and reproduction to innately neutral stimuli (CSs) that
are repeatedly experienced as predictors of the stimuli (USs) that trigger those
responses. This section illustrates in detail the operation of this fundamental
function of Amg with respect to the three classes of unconditioned responses:
regulation of body states (section 4.1), diffuse brain modulation (section 4.2),
and triggering of unlearned behaviors (section 4.3). Recall from section 2 that
the processes regulating these three kinds of basic responses are here assumed
to be essential components of motivations and emotions.
4.1 Regulation of body states
The regulation of body states based on external events is a fundamental func-
tionality for complex organisms that have several needs to satisfy. For example,
if an organism is going to eat, it is useful for it to prepare for digestion by sali-
vating and increasing the blood flow to the gut. But if a predator suddenly
appears, the same organism has to prepare its body for fighting or fleeing, for
example by suddenly redirecting the blood flow to the muscles, by increasing
the heart rate, by increasing glucose release, etc.
Thanks to its associative properties, Amg can trigger these body regulations
not only in response to innately relevant stimuli but also in response to stim-
uli which are constantly experienced as preceding or accompanying them. The
adaptive advantages of these capability are evident: body states can be trig-
gered in advance with respect to the events that make them useful. These pro-
cesses are captured in the laboratory by the classical experiments of Pavlov, in
which a dog learns to prepare its body for digestion by salivating in advance
when it hears a bell that has been systematically associated with the delivery of
food.
Many of these body regulations take place via the influence of the ‘auto-
nomic nervous system’ (ANS), which includes the sympathetic and parasym-
pathetic nervous systems (SNS and PSNS, respectively). The SNS is always ac-
tive at a basal level (‘sympathetic tone’) and becomes more active during times
of stress. Under stressing conditions the SNS prepares the body for fight-or-flight
responses by enhancing arousal and energy generation and inhibits digestion.
In particular, it diverts blood flow away from the gastro-intestinal tract and skin
via vasoconstriction, enhances blood flow to skeletal muscles and lungs, di-
lates bronchioles of lungs, increases heart rate, dilates pupils, inhibits peristalsis
(Davis and Whalen, 2001; Iversen et al., 2000). The PSNS has a complementary
function with respect to the SNS: in general, it can be said to prepare the body
for a rest-and-digest mode of behaviour in that it promotes calm action and di-
gestion. In particular, in absence of salient stimuli and compelling needs, PSNS
dilates blood vessels leading to the gastro-intestinal tract, constricts the bron-
chiolar diameter in lungs, diminishes heart rate, causes constriction of pupils,
stimulates salivary gland secretion, accelerates peristalsis, and causes erection
of genitals (Iversen et al., 2000).
Amg influences the SNS and the PSNS mainly via CEA (Davis and Whalen,
2001). In particular CEA influences the SNS via efferent connections directed to
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various nuclei of Hyp, mainly LH, PO, and PVN (Jolkkonen and Pitka¨nen 1998;
Knapska et al. 2007; see figure 6) which in turn send efferent connections to the
brain-stem and the spinal-cord (Davis and Whalen, 2001). Through its connec-
tions to LH, CEA can influence thirst and hunger (that is, the perception of the
internal lack of water and food). Through its connections to PO, it can modu-
late urination, heart rate, and blood pressure. Through its connections to PVN,
it can influence gastric reflexes, blood pressure, and temperature regulation.
CEA influences the PSNS via connections to DMX, AMB, and MEV (Knap-
ska et al. 2007; figure 6). These allow CEA to contribute to regulate body func-
tions such as salivation, lacrimation, digestion, urination, and defecation.
The innervations to PVN are also very important as they allow CEA to con-
trol the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, which, via the Pituitary gland (or ‘hy-
pophysis’), has a major role in the regulation of the network of body hormones
(Iversen et al., 2000). Through this axis CEA can influence virtually all internal
processes, including water retention, blood pressure, temperature regulation,
male aggression, uterine contractions and lactation, the production of extro-
gens, analgesy, and metabolism of nutrients (Iversen et al., 2000).
4.2 Diffuse brain modulation
Like the regulation of the body, the regulation of diffuse brain states plays a cen-
tral role for organisms that have to satisfy several different needs. In fact, the
performance of different activities requires the differential involvement of dif-
ferent brain areas and the functioning of such areas with different modes. The
modulation of brain activity is accomplished in two ways: (a) indirectly, via the
body, through the activation of endocrine glands that release hormones in the
blood (hormones regulate both the body and brain states); (b) directly, via the
activation of ancient nuclei of neurons that release the four principal neuromod-
ulators: the monoamine serotonin (5-HT), and the three catecholamine dopamine
(DA), norepinephrine (NE; also named ‘noradrenaline’), and acetylcholine (ACh).
The neuromodulators are produced in two main ways, that tend to have differ-
ent effects on target neurons:
1. Tonic production involves a prolonged populational activation of the neuro-
modulatory neurons, typically induced via their diffused GABAergic dis-
inhibition, which leads to the accumulation of the neuromodulator in the
extrasynaptic space. The main effect of tonic production of neuromodula-
tors is the general modulation of the targeted areas.
2. Phasic production involves a high but short activation of the neuromodula-
tory neurons, typically induced via their glutammaergic direct activation,
which leads to fast but temporary high increase of neuromodulator in the
intra-synaptic space. Phasic production of neuromodulators is supposed to
have an important role in learning processes (see the case of DA, below)
and for quick regulation of brain states when speed is paramount (e.g., to
face a predator).
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Fig. 6. Body states regulation: schematization of how amygdala contributes to regu-
late the body states via the sympathetic, parasympathetic and hormonal systems. An-
cronyms: AMB (nucleus ambiguus), CEA (central extended amygdala), DMX (dorsal
motor nucleus of the vagus nerve), Hyp (hypothalamus), LH (lateral hypothalamus),
MEV (midbrain trigeminal nucleus), PO (preoptic nucleus of hypothalamus), PVN (par-
aventricular nucleus of hypothalamus), Pit (pituitary gland).
Evenwith respect to the brainmodulation, the core function of Amg is based
on its capacity to transfer the effects genetically associated to biologically salient
stimuli (US) to innately neutral stimuli (CS). So, for example, the increased lev-
els of stress- and alertness-related regulations innately associated to the percep-
tion of a predator can be transferred to the type of noises which preceded the
attack, or to the sight of the place where the attack took place.
The Amg exerts brain modulations mainly via CEA (Davis and Whalen,
2001), which is connected to the main brain nuclei that are responsible of the
production of the neuromodulators. One important exception is the modula-
tion by BLA of the burst firing of the dopamine neurons via glutamatergic pro-
jections to LH (Petrovich et al. 2002, 2005; see also section 3.2).
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Fig. 7. Brain states regulation: schematization of how amygdala contributes to regu-
late brain states via the diffused action of neuromodulators. Ancronyms: VTA (ven-
tral tegmental area), SNpc (substantia nigra pars compacta), LC (locus coeruleus), PPT
(pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus), LDT (laterodorsal tegmental nucleus), SI (sub-
stantia innominata), DR (dorsal raphe), ACh (acetylcholine), DA (dopamine), NE (nore-
pinephrine), 5HT (serotonine).
Amg modulates the production of DA by influencing the two main cen-
ters of dopaminergic neurons: VTA, which reaches NAcc and PFC (Fudge and
Haber, 2000; Fudge and Emiliano, 2003), and SNpc, which sends projections
principally to BG, especially its DLS and DMS components (Han et al., 1997;
Lee et al., 2005). Tonic DA enhances the general level of processing of PFC,
thus enhancing working memory and attention (Phillips et al., 2008). Moreover,
tonic DA in NAcc seems to modulate organisms’ vigor, that is the number of
actions that the animal performs in a given amount of time and the involve-
ment of energy spent in their execution (Niv et al., 2006; Floresco, 2007). Phasic
DA signals the positive/negative salience of stimuli that is at the basis of learn-
ing processes taking place within BG (Schultz, 2002; Surmeier et al., 2007) and
vmPFC (Otani et al., 2003).
Amg modulates the production of NE through LC, which innervates virtu-
ally the whole cortex, BG, Th, Hyp, Hip, CB, and the spinal cord (Berridge and
Waterhouse, 2003; Aston Jones and Cohen, 2005). NE plays an important func-
tion in the regulation of the sleep/wake cycle, attention, arousal, and work-
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ing memory, on the basis of the novelty of perceivevd stimuli and contexts
(Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003).4
Amg regulates the production of Ach mainly via PPT, LDT (Semba and
Fibiger, 1992; Knapska et al., 2007), and SI (Jolkkonen et al., 2002), which in-
nervate the brainstem, Amg, Hip, and PFC. In the central nervous system, Ach
is known to modulate the sleep/wake cycle, synaptic plasticity (LTP), general
excitability, arousal, and reward (Chen et al., 2006). 5
Both directly and via LH and PAG (Peyron et al., 1998; Bandler et al., 2000),
Amg regulates the production of 5-HT by the DR, which innervates BG (in-
cluding NAcc), Th, Hyp, Hip, Amg, and virtually the whole cortex (Barnes and
Sharp, 1999). 5-HT modulates mood, anger, aggression, stress, sleep, body tem-
perature, and metabolism (Nelson and Trainor, 2007; Grahn et al., 1999; Maier
and Watkins, 2005; Sørensen et al., 2000).6
4.3 Triggering of unlearned behaviors
In probably all animals, evolution has led to the emergence of a number of
stereotyped unlearned basic behaviours that are triggered when specific stim-
uli are perceived. For example, these behaviours lead a hungry rat to approach
food as soon as this is perceived (e.g., smelled), and, once it is close to the
mouth, to ingest it. Similarly, a rat will regularly perform a rearing behaviour
directed to detect predators. In case the rat spots one, it will freeze if the preda-
tor is far or startle and then engage in flight or fight behaviors if the predator is
close.
Amg plays two important functions in the selection of these behaviors. First,
it allows the anticipatory execution of these behaviours in correspondence to
previously neutral stimuli which predict the appearence of the stimuli that in-
nately trigger the behaviours. For example, the sight of a landmark previously
associated with food might trigger an approaching behaviour directed to it and
this might allow obtaining the food; a particular smell associated with a preda-
tor might trigger a startle reflex and then a flight behaviour. Second, Amgmod-
ulates the triggering of these basic behaviours on the basis of relevant internal
states. For example, a rat can stop executing a feeding behaviour if it becomes
satiated, or can decide whether to fight or flight on the basis of its perceived
internal state.
The Amg exerts a control on unlearned behaviours on the basis of a com-
plex network of connections that CEA has with various nuclei (figure 8). So, for
example, CEA can trigger freezing and fleeing behaviours via PAG (Bandler
et al., 2000; Davis and Whalen, 2001), and the startle reflex via NRPC (Davis
4 NE plays an important function also within the sympathetic system and is also re-
leased as a hormone in the blood by adrenal medulla.
5 Ach is also used in the peripheral nervous system to activate muscles.
6 5-HT is also a peripheral signal mediator, in particular within the guts autonomic
system.
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and Whalen, 2001). Furthermore, CEA might also exploit more indirect mecha-
nisms based on DA to modulate the triggering and execution of feeding, rear-
ing and approaching behaviours. In particular, CEAmight enhance feeding be-
haviours via the dopaminergic modulation of NAccS-VP-LH pathway through
VTA (Ahn and Phillips, 2002; Wyvell and Berridge, 2000; Smith and Berridge,
2005; Tindell et al., 2006). Similarly, rearing seems to be performed on the basis
of a striato-cortical loop passing through DLS-PMC-MC and might be modu-
lated by CEA via a DA influence passing through SNpc (Han et al., 1997). In
a similar way, the fundamental behaviour of approaching, which plays a cen-
tral role in the adaptation of organisms as it allows them to get in contact with
the needed resources scattered in the environment, is performed via a second
striato-cortical loop involving NAccC and AC, which can be influenced by CEA
through DA produced via connections to VTA (Parkinson et al., 2000; Cardinal
et al., 2003). Note how these mechanisms differ from the direct triggering of
basic behaviors, like the one that passes through PAG: in fact, they imply an
existing tendency to perform the behaviour (for example, moving towards a
perceived object), and a modulation by Amg of this tendency (this modula-
tion is thought to be performed through the VTA-NAcc or the nigro-striatal
dopaminergic connections). Finally, note that the difference between the direct
triggering of basic behaviors (e.g., freezing) and themodulation of the probabil-
ity of performing some generic behavior (e.g., approaching) might constitute a
general difference between negative-conditioning and appetitive-conditioning
phenomena.
5 The roles of amygdala in cognitive processes
Thanks to its capacity to trigger basic affective responses on the basis of con-
ditioning processes, amygdala also evolved the capacity to act as a link be-
tween affective processes and cognitive ones, thus allowing the development
of important new functionalities. In this section we discuss three fundamental
new cognitive functions allowed (or enhanced) by Amg: affective labeling (5.1),
goal-directed behavior (5.2), and planning and decision making (5.3).
5.1 Affective labeling
One of the most important memory functions of the brain is its capacity to
quickly store specific events characterised by unique and arbitrary configura-
tions of objects and events in space. This capability plays a very important role
for organisms’ survival as it allows them to store important information on the
basis of a few experiences or even a single experience.
This functionality relies heavily on Hip and its peculiar anatomical and
physiological properties. These properties have been specified at a theoretical
level in McClelland et al. (1995), have been modelled in Alvarez and Squire
(1994), and can be summarised as follows (cf. Rolls and Kesner, 2006): (a) Hip
has important reciprocal connections with many associative cortical areas (e.g.,
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Fig. 8. Triggering of unlearned behaviors: schematization of how amygdala contributes
to the triggering of unlearned behaviors via different sub-cortical and cortical brain ar-
eas. Acronyms: AC (anterior cingulate cortex), CeA (central amygdaloid nucleus), DLS
(dorsolateral striatum), LH (lateral hypothalamus), MC (motor cortex), NAccC (nucleus
accumbens core), NAccS (nucleus accumbens shell), NRPC (nucleus reticularis pontis
caudalis), PAG (periaqueductal gray), PMC (premotor cortex), SNpc (substantia nigra,
pars compacta), VTA (ventral tegmental area).
PFC, IT, PPC) and sub-cortical nuclei (e.g., NAcc and Amg); (b) Hip neurons
have massive lateral connectivity; (c) Hip is one of the brain loci where rapid
associative learning leading to Long Term Potentiation is strongly present; (d)
Hip has been shown to reactivate during sleeping (McClelland et al., 1995; Es-
chenko et al., 2008).
On this basis, McClelland et al. (1995) suggested that Hip plays an impor-
tant role in episodic memory acquisition and consolidation. In particular, Hip can
rapidly form neural associations between sub-clusters of its neurons and sev-
eral different multimodal activation patterns that take place in different brain
areas at the same time. Consequently, Hip can form representations of any ar-
bitrary polimodal pattern existing at a certain time. According to the authors,
the later spontaneous reactivation of Hip clusters (e.g., during sleep) causes
the reactivation of the corresponding patterns located in the various areas of
the brain and so allows the formation of direct connections between them (‘con-
solidation’). With consolidation, the patterns initially stored in Hip either fade
away (within days/months) or continue to contribute, at least in part, to mem-
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Fig. 9.Affective labeling: schematization of how amygdala ‘tags’ memories stored inHip
and cortex through affective evaluations of stimuli and episodes. Plastic connections and
innate connections are respectively indicated with gray and black arrows. Acronyms:
Amg (amygdala), BLA (basolateral amygdaloid complex), Hip (hippocpampus), PFC
(prefrontal cortex), PPC (posterior parietal cortex), Te (temporal cortex).
ory recall processes (Rolls and Kesner, 2006). The slow speed and intermixed
order with which consolidation of different experiences takes place within the
Hip target areas allows the formation of semantic long-term memories hav-
ing a high degree of generalisation within them. With repetition, this allows
such areas to capture the common structure existing in the different experienced
episodes.
BLA plays at least two important roles in the formation of episodic memo-
ries within Hip. First of all, it is important that only the experiences with high
relevance for survival and reproduction are stored by Hip. Being the pivot of
affective regulations, Amg contains the information needed to decide which
events, either with a positive or negative value, might have a high biological
relevance, and therefore deserve to be stored in Hip. This first function is likely
played by the Amg on the basis of its influence on neuromodulators (cf. sec-
tion 4.2), which play a very important role in Hip learning.
A second, more direct, function played by Amg in episodic and semantic
memories is based on the massive reciprocal connections it forms with Hip.
These connections allow Amg to furnish Hip with the current affective con-
text, which is to be integrated with the other cognitive components that form
24
the episodes to be stored. With the consolidation process driven by Hip, the
information stored within Amg gets directly associated with other cortical and
sub-cortical areas with which it is directly or indirectly (especially via PFC) con-
nected. In this way, such information comes to play the role of a sort of affective
tag associated with the stored episodes. This association allows two fundamen-
tal processes to take place. First, it allows affective reactions taking place with-
ing Amg to contribute to the recall of memories stored within the Hip or within
the areas with which the current affective context has been associated during
consolidation (LaBar and Cabeza, 2006; Phelps, 2004). Second, when Hip, or
the areas linked between them during consolidation, recall particular episodes,
their association with Amg allows them to reactivate the affective valence of
such episodes within Amg itself. This in turn can lead to: (a) triggering of the
brain and body regulations that are suitable for the given episode (this might be
important if the current situation is similar to the recalled episode); (b) inform-
ing the Hip (via reciprocal connections from Amg) on the biological saliency of
the recalled episode (this might be important when Hip itself exerts a direct or
indirect influence on action).
So, for example, imagine a rat has experienced an attack from a predator af-
ter having perceived a particular noise in a certain location of the environment.
A later sight of the same place might trigger the recall of the noise memory
(and hence trigger a useful priming effect which would facilitate the detection
of the noise) and this might activate the relatedmemories of the negative effects
of the attack within Amg (thanks to a CS-US association). In turn, this reacti-
vation might not only trigger a suitable regulation of the body (e.g., making
the body ready for fleeing or fighting) and the brain (e.g., enhancing attentive
processes and general arousal), but also contribute to the recall of further mem-
ories within Hip (or within the areas connected by it during consolidation), for
example the path followed to reach a safe place after the attack.
5.2 Goal-directed behaviors
Asmentioned in section 3, instrumental (or ‘operant’) learning represents, aside
Pavlovian learning, one of the two fundamental processes underling individual
learning in complex organisms (Thorndike, 1911; Skinner, 1938; Domjan, 2006).
As we have seen, instrumental learning allows organisms to form stable S-R
associations between stimuli and responses, initially produced by chance, if the
latter allow obtaining rewards or avoiding punishments. The acquisition of S-
R associations is well captured by reinforcement learning models (Barto, 1995;
Sutton and Barto, 1998). Such S-R associations are acquired onlywith prolonged
training and form efficient but rather rigid ‘habits’ that are performed indepen-
dently of the current value of the pursued outcome (e.g., food, see below).
Basal ganglia are considered to be the main locus where operant condition-
ing associations take place. In particular, the macro-loop formed by DLS with
cortex (in particular PMC/MC) via the Th, is known to play a fundamental role
in both the acquisition and the expression of S-R associations (Yin and Knowl-
ton, 2006).
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Fig. 10. Goal-directed behaviour: schematization of how amygdala contributes to bias
the selection of instrumentally-acquired stimuli. Plastic connections and innate con-
nections are respectively indicated with thin and thick arrows. Circle edges denote in-
hibitory connections whilst arrow edges denote excitatory connections. Acronyms: Amg
(amygdala), BG (basal ganglia), BLA (basolateral amygdaloid complex), DLS (dorso-
lateral striatum), GPi (globus pallidus, internal segment), MC (motor cortex), NAccC
(nucleus accumbens core), PL (prelimbic cortex), PMC (premotor cortex), VP (ventral
pallidum).
Other portions of BG, in particular the two macro striato-thalamo-cortical
loops DMS-PFC/PPC and NAcc/vmPFC, play a rather different role. In par-
ticular, the DMS-PFC/PPC loop plays an important role in the initial phases
of learning, when the S-R habits are not formed yet (Yin and Knowlton, 2006).
The NAcc/vmPFC loop, which is particularly relevant here for the strong pro-
jections it gets from the BLA, is very important for the selection of an action on
the basis of the current value of its outcome (action-outcome, or A-O, associ-
ations), for example the current potential value of the pursued food (Balleine
and Dickinson, 1998).
The behaviors modulated on the basis of A-O associations have a typical
goal-directed nature in that they lead to select an action on the basis of a rela-
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tion which goes from the outcomes of the action to the action itself and so inverts
the temporal and causal relationship existing between them (actions cause the
achievement of outcomes; cf. Hommel, 2005; Pezzulo et al., 2007). In this re-
spect, the goal-directed modulation of the selection of instrumental behaviours
considered here represents the first fundamental departure from the S-R habit
scheme. This departure reaches its maximumdegree of development with plan-
ning and complex decision making, which will be described in section 5.3.
The functionality accomplished by the A-O mechanisms has a fundamental
adaptive role: it allows internal body states and needs, via the MEA-BLA path-
way, to bias the selection of different instrumentally-acquired behaviors which
might be triggered in a given situation. An example of this is elegantly captured
by instrumental devaluation experiments in which a rat that can perform two in-
strumentally acquired actions to achieve two different outcomes (e.g., different
resources satisfying different needs). In this case, rats are able to appropriately
select which action to perform on the basis of the current configuration of their
internal states and needs. These mechanisms clearly add a great flexibility to
a rigid stimulus-response system that is insensible to the current state of the
animal (ses section 4.1 above).
Balleine and Dickinson (1998) pioneered a whole new research agenda de-
voted to the study of A-O behaviours and to contrast themwith S-R behaviours
traditionally studied within the behaviourist approach. These authors give an
operational definition of goal-directed behaviours based on two classes of ex-
periments:
1. Goal-directed behaviours are sensitive to the degradation of the A-O con-
tingency, that is the strength of the causal relationship existing between the
performance of an action and the achievement of the related outcome (the
contingency strength is measured on the basis of the relation existing be-
tween the probabilities of obtaining the outcome with and without the ac-
tion). If the triggering of an instrumentally acquired action is sensitive to
the degradation of the A-O contingency (e.g., when the outcome is deliv-
ered non-contingently to the action), then the action is considered to be
goal-directed; otherwise it is considered to have become a habit (Balleine
and Dickinson, 1998).
2. Goal-directed behaviours are immediately (i.e. without the need of a new
training) sensitive to manipulations of the value that the organism assigns
to the outcome (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). For example, in a typical in-
strumental devaluation experiment (Balleine et al., 2003) one of two foods
(‘Food1’ and ‘Food2’) previously used to form two instrumental associa-
tions, ‘PressLever1-Food1’ and ‘PressLever2-Food2’ , is ‘devaluated’ by al-
lowing the rat to freely access it (e.g., Food1). In a successive test the rat is
exposed to both Lever1 and Lever2. If the rat has a bias to select the lever
that is associated to the non-devaluated food, then the behavior is consid-
ered to be goal-directed, otherwise it is considered a habit.
Figure 10 presents a scheme that illustrates the most important mechanisms
involved in goal-directed behaviour, for example the instrumental devalua-
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tion experiment illustrated above (a simple version of the model based on this
scheme that reproduce some of the available data on real rats has already been
published in Mannella et al., 2007, 2009; the model is now being further refined
so to reproduce a higher number of data, in particular on lesions). In the model,
stimulus-response (S-R) associations acquired on the basis of external rewards
are stored in the left part of the system shown in the figure: in particular, in
the connections that bring the information on neutral stimuli to the DLS/GPi
pathway of the basal ganglia. This sub-system allows the rat to acquire the two
instrumental action ‘PressLever1-Food1’ and ‘PressLever2-Food2’ in the first
phase of the experiment, when the two levers are presented separately. In the
test phase, which takes place after one of the two foods has been devaluated
with free access to it (say Food1), the two levers are presented together. In this
condition the rat exhibits a strong tendency to select the lever that is associated
to the non-devaluated food (Lever2) thanks to the biasing effects that Amg indi-
rectly exerts on the S-R system through the NAccC/VP-PL pathway. This effect
depends on three fundamental mechanisms:
1. While in the first phase of the experiment the rat instrumentally acquires
the S-R responses, the creation of the contingency between the observation
of each lever and the following reception of the corresponding food allows
Amg to form two CS-US associations: Lever1-Food1 and Lever2-Food2.
2. In the devaluation phase, when the rat gets satiated with one food (e.g.,
Food1), the resulting internal state inhibits the corresponding representa-
tion of food (US) within BLA.
3. When in the last phase the rat is exposed to the two levers, only one of
the two representations of the levers (CSs) within Amg succeed to activate
the corresponding US representation and so to exert an influence on the
corresponding S-R association via NAccC (Corbit et al., 2001). Importantly,
the actual biasing effects of Amg on instrumental behaviors, which instan-
tiate the A-O associations within the model, can be performed both via the
striato-nigro-striatal connections (‘dopamine spirals’, Haber, 2003) and via
PFC (in particular, PL: Corbit and Balleine, 2003).
These mechanisms capture the essence of how Amg can increase the adap-
tation of animals thanks to its capacity of forming CS-US associations (within
BLA) and of modulating their activation on the basis of internal states (through
MEA). In particular, this section has shown how these capabilities add an im-
portant flexibility to the selection of inherently-rigid habits acquired with in-
strument conditioning.
5.3 Planning and decision making
Planning and decision making can be considered the hallmark of complex cog-
nition inmammals. Planning consists in the internal generation of trajectories in
the space of possible future environment states on the basis of available actions
(Dagher et al., 2001). Decision making involves the selection among alternative
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Fig. 11. Planning: schematization of how amygdala contributes to planning by furnish-
ing values to anticipated states. Left: a hypothetical task involving planning. Right: a
possible model to tackle the task. All connections in the model are learned in the vari-
ous phases of the process (see text). A;B;C; S states corresponding to being in different
chambers; L: lever; NS: neutral stimulus; CS: conditioned stimulus; S: state; A: action
leading from one state to another. Acronyms: Amg (amygdala), BLA (basolateral amyg-
daloid complex), PFC (prefrontal cortex), PMC (premotor cortex).
actions on the basis of a calculation of the actions’ possible consequences, their
values, and their estimated probabilities of actually happening (Bechara et al.,
1996). Thus, the core functionality underlying both planning and decision mak-
ing seems to be the capacity of producing internal representations of possible
future states whichmight be experienced as a consequence of one’s own actions
(Miller and Cohen, 2001).
The development of these capabilities has reached the maximum level of
sophistication in humans thanks to the evolution of an exceptionally extended
and complex PFC cortex (and, probably, thanks to the use of language as a cog-
nitive tool: see Mirolli and Parisi, 2009, 2010). In this respect, the PFC represents
the brain area governing behaviour at the maximum level of abstraction and in-
volving the longest time scope of cognition (Miller and Cohen, 2001).
The amygdala’a role in planning and decision making is based on its ca-
pacity to provide the values of the imagined possible states in order to bias the
selection of a course of actions towards the maximization of the probability of
achieving biological advantages while reducing physical damages and other
costs to a minimum (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004). In this respect, imagine a rat
which has previously experienced food in a certain place in the environment
but, on the way to it, it smells the presence of a predator, for example a cat. The
rat has to decide whether to keep on moving forward towards the food, or, say,
to detour and reach the food by following a much longer route. Crucially, this
decision should depend on several factors, such as the chances of encountering
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the predator along the direct path (which might be signalled by the intensity
of the predator’s smell), the anticipated energy spent in the detour, the knowl-
edge of the path to be followed in the case of the detour, the information from
the body related to the current level of hunger, and so on.
A possible experiment capturing this type of situation, which is inspired by
response-preconditioning experiments (St Claire-Smith and MacLaren, 1983),
is as follows. Consider a rat that is set in a chamber S from which it can access
two chambers A and B by entering their respective gated entrances (the gates
prevent the rat from seeing the inside of A and B from S). Now assume that
each of the two chambers A and B contains a lever, respectively LeverA and
LeverB, and that the rat is left free to explore this environment for a prolonged
period of time (this allows the rat to experience the passage between S, A and
B, and to experience the levers with not reward). Also assume that the rat can
experience a further level, LeverC, in a chamber Cwhich does not communicate
with either S, A or B. Finally, assume that in a second training phase, composed
of three sub-phases, the same rat experiences: (a) a LeverA-food association in
A; (b) a LeverC-food association in C; (c) a LeverB-no food condition in B. Now,
if in a third phase the rat is set in S, one might expect that the rat would exhibit
the tendency to enter A more than B, as in A it would expect to see LeverA,
which has been associated with food in the second phase.
Figure 11 shows a sketch of a model which might be implemented to repro-
duce the role of Amg and PFC (in particular OFC, IL, and PL) in the described
experiment. The figure shows that the experience of the first phase might al-
low the rat to form associations between the representations of both chambers
A and B and the representation of chamber S in PFC, linked, respectively, by
the representations of the actions that lead from S to A (AS A) and from S to B
(AS B). Furthermore, suppose that appropriate associations have been formed
also between the representations of S, A, B, and C in PFC and the corresponding
representations in Amg (CSS , CSA,CSB , and CSC). When, in the third phase,
the rat is set in S, the PFC representation of S might cause an anticipatory re-
activation of the internal representations of A and B, via AS A and AS B , re-
spectively, but not of C, as the rat has not experienced any action which can
lead from S to C. The activation of SA and SB in PFC would cause the corre-
sponding representations within Amg to be activated (CSA and CSB). Since
only CSA is able to reactivate the representation of food (US), this might pro-
duce a feedback signal to the PFC representation of A, which would strengthen
the activation of AS A in comparison to AS B . This might lead to the selection
and performance of action AS A versus AS B at the level of the striato-cortical
loops (in particular, DMS and DLS, and PMC andMC), with which PFC is both
directly and indirectly connected.
Amg and PFC, in particular BLA and OFC, play also a key role in com-
plex decision making. This is demonstrated, for example, by the experiments
of Winstanley et al. (2004), who trained rats with two levers, one producing a
small immediate amount of food and the second one producing a larger but
delayed amount of food (see also Mobini et al., 2002). Interestingly, rats which
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received a post-training lesion of BLA exhibited a higher tendency to select the
immediate-food lever in comparison to shams whereas rats which received a
post-training lesion of OFC exhibited a higher tendency to select the delayed-
food lever. Although a commonly accepted explanation of these experiments is
not available yet (cf. Mobini et al., 2002; Winstanley et al., 2004; Schoenbaum
et al., 2007), they show that OFC and BLA play a central role in complex deci-
sion making.
It is interesting to relate these data on rats with those on complex decision
making in humans. For example, humans with a damaged Amg/OFC/vmPFC
perform poorly in tasks requiring the integration of information about imag-
ined gains and costs in the financial domain. Bechara et al. (1994) developed a
task, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), specifically for studying this kind of dys-
functions. In this task, the subjects have to choose a card from one of two decks:
one deck produces low monetary gains with a high probability, while the other
produces high gains with a low probability but also high losses. On average, the
net gain with the first deck is higher than that with the second deck. Whereas
control subjects learn to choose cards from the first deck and also exhibit an in-
creased skin conductance before selecting a card from the second deck, patients
with damage to either the Amg or the vmPFC tend to prefer the high-risk deck
and also fail to show increased skin conductance.
Bechara et al. (1996) have proposed that Amg and vmPFC play a central
role in guiding choices in the IGT. The idea, which is in line with our pro-
posal discussed in relation to figure 11, is that PFC anticipates possible future
events (e.g., financial gains or damages) which are evaluated by the PFC-Amg
re-entrant loops thanks to the capacity of Amg of activating the body reactions
that would follow from the actual experience of such events. In this respect,
these affective body reactions play the role of ‘somatic markers’ of possible
events that, once propagated back to PFC, support the selection or rejection
of the alternative courses of available action.
6 Conclusion
The amygdala is a brain system that plays a fundamental role in the affective
regulation of body, brain, and behaviour. This paper has presented the general
principles that might underlie the inner functioning of the amygdala, and has
illustrated how these principles might allow the amygdala to play a key role in
several affective and cognitive processes. In particular, we have shown how the
amygdala is capable of integrating information from internal states, innately
relevant stimuli, and innately neutral stimuli on the basis of three core mech-
anisms. First, the amygdala directly associates important basic reactions (e.g.,
approaching and salivation) that are innately triggered by biologically relevant
stimuli (e.g., food) to neutral stimuli (e.g., the sight of a landmark signaling the
presence of food). Second, the amygdala associates representations of neutral
stimuli (e.g., of the landmark) to representations of biologically relevant stim-
uli (e.g., the food), thus transferring all the properties of the latter to the former.
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Third, the amygdala modulates these associations on the basis of the internal
states of the animal (e.g., satiation can inhibit both the triggering of salivation
caused by the sight of a landmark predicting food and the re-activation of the
internal representation of the food itself).
Furthermore, we have shown how these basic functioning principles of the
amygdala allow it to play a role in the regulation of three fundamental classes
of affetive processes, namely: (a) the regulation of body states; (b) the regulation
of brain states via the principal neuromodulators; (c) the triggering of a number
of basic behaviours relevant for the organism’s survival and reproduction.
Finally, we have shown how the same mechanisms allow the amygdala to
exert an important affective influence on cognition, thus permitting the emer-
gence of three high-level cognitive processes: (a) the affective labeling of mem-
ories with the biological valence of stimuli and episodes; (b) the biasing of the
selection of instrumental responses on the basis of the current valence of their
expected outcomes; (c) the biasing of planning and decision making processes
through the ‘marking’ of possible states and actions with their affective valence.
Both the overall picture and the specific claims proposed in the article have
been developed by trying to fulfill two main constraints: on one hand, the
biological constraints coming from the currently available empirical knowl-
edge; on the other hand, the computational constraints that depend on trying
to build working systemic models which can reproduce and explain empiri-
cal phenomena. Moreover, further sources of constraints came from assuming
a functional/adaptive stance, and the will to isolate general principles, rather
than ad-hoc explanations of single phenomena/experiments.
In this respect, it is important to note that while some of the ideas presented
here can be considered as acquired knowledge in the field of affective neuro-
science, other ideas constitute original hypotheses that are well supported by
the available empirical knowledge, and still others (hopefully a minority) rep-
resent more speculative ideas that will turn out to be wrong from an empirical
point of view. We think that the speculative nature of some of the ideas pre-
sented here does not represent a serious problem since the value of the paper is
to be found not in any of the specific hypotheses we have presented but rather
in the whole picture that we have provided regarding the biological organi-
zation of some important adaptive behavior. This picture has been centered
on the amygdala because this plays a fundamental role in interfacing motiva-
tional/emotional processes and cognitive processes.
We hope that the detailed and coherent picture provided here will con-
tribute on one hand to foster more theoretically oriented research within affec-
tive neuroscience and on the other hand to produce more biologically-informed
computational models of the affective aspects of adaptive behavior. More in
general, we hope that this kind of work will foster an increase in the interac-
tions between the empirical and the synthetic sciences devoted to study (the
affective aspects of) the brain and behavior.
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Appendix: Acronyms







AB Accessory basal amygdaloid nucleus
AC Anterior cingulate cortex
AMB Nucleus ambiguus
Amg Amygdala
B Basal amygdaloid nucleus
BG Basal ganglia
BL Basolateral amygdaloid nucleus
BLA Basolateral amygdaloid complex
BNST Bed Nucleus of the stria terminalis
CB Cerebellum
CEA Central extended amygdala
CeA Central amygdaloid nucleus
CL Central lateral amygdaloid nucleus
CLC Central amygdaloid nucleus, lateral
capsular suddivision
CM Central medial amygdaloid nucleus
DI Disgranular insular cortex
DIg Disgranular insular cortex, gustatory
part














LA Lateral amygdaloid nucleus
LC Locus coeruleus
LDT Laterodorsal tegmental nucleus
LG Lateral geniculate nucleus
LH Lateral hypothalamus
Ld Lateral dorsal amygdaloid nucleus
Lvl Lateral ventrolateral amygdaloid nu-
cleus




MEA Medial extended amygdala
MEV Midbrain trigeminal nucleus
MG Medial geniculate nucleus
Md Medial amygdaloid nucleus, dorsal
part
MeA Medial amygdaloid nucleus
Mv Medial amygdaloid nucleus, ventral
part
NAcc Nucleus accumbens
NAccC Nucleus accumbens core
NAccS Nucleus accumbens shell
NRPC Nucleus reticularis pontis caudalis











PO Preoptic nucleus of hypothalamus
PPC Posterior parietal cortex
PPT Pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus
PRC Perirhinal cortex
PVN Paraventricular nucleus of hypothala-
mus
PaRh Parietal rhinal cortex
S Subiculum
SI Substantia innominata
SNpc Substantia nigra, pars compacta
Te Temporal cortex
Te2 Temporal cortex, Area 2
Te3 Temporal cortex, Area 3
Th Thalamus
VMH Ventromedial hypothalamus
vmPFC Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
VP Ventral pallidum
VPMpc Ventral posteromedial nucleus, parvi-
cellular part
VTA Ventral tegmental area
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